ToldorSold?

Told or Sold?B2B SaaS companies tell buyers and investors a great commercial story.We find what breaks, what holds, and how it should be selling.

Independent commercial diligence on B2B SaaS, for the buyers and investors behind the deal. Whether the potential is real. Whether the commercial engine works without the founder. What the market says when nobody is preparing the answer. And what a good operator would change from Monday.

What you are told, and what is underneath it

None of these are lies. Most founders believe every one of them, and a good part of each is usually true. They are simply claims that nobody in the process has been asked to evidence.

What SaaS founders told youWhat they really sold you
ToldLogo retention is 95%.
SoldLogo retention counts companies. Net revenue retention counts money, and where nobody tracks it, it commonly lands twenty points lower. The gap is seats cut quietly at renewal rather than customers walking out the door.
ToldPricing is in line with the market.
SoldIn line with a market that has since moved. Where a price has not changed in years the list price is fiction and the discount sheet is the real one: the same ten points come off almost every deal, and nobody has tested whether they had to.
ToldWe have a strong commercial team.
SoldBelow ten million in revenue, the number of people who have closed above average contract value with the founder off the call is usually one. That is not a sales team, it is a founder and four salaries.
ToldThe pipeline covers the plan three times over.
SoldCoverage counts everything anyone ever entered. The share carrying a named next step and a date against it is normally about a quarter. The rest is a list of companies that once took a meeting.
ToldChurn sits in small accounts we chose not to keep.
SoldThe choosing usually happened after they left. Those accounts were the fastest to close, sold by someone who has since gone, into a segment nobody has revisited. What matters is not their size, it is that nothing was learned from them.
ToldWe have never really done outbound. That is the upside.
SoldUntried is not the same as untapped. Where inbound built the business, the pricing, the motion and the people are all tuned to buyers who arrived already convinced. Outbound is a different company, not a spare channel.
ToldCustomers love us. Here are three references.
SoldThree prepared conversations. The last five losses are unrehearsed, and they are the ones who will tell you which competitor is actually winning, and on what.
ToldThe main risk is execution.
SoldExecution risk is where a commercial case goes to avoid being specific. Which segment, at which price, through which motion, and what happens to the number if that answer is wrong.

Claims we hear in almost every process, and what sits underneath them once someone looks. These are recurring patterns rather than case studies: the exact number is different in every company, which is the whole reason it has to be tested rather than read.

Everybody checks the numbers. Nobody checks whether it still sells.

Financial diligence confirms the earnings are real. Legal confirms the contracts. Technical diligence confirms the code. Then the commercial case, the one that actually decides whether this was a good purchase, gets answered by reading the management presentation more carefully than the last person did.

In an industrial business you could get away with that. You can count competitors, walk the floor, benchmark cost per unit. In a vertical SaaS company doing a few million in recurring revenue none of that exists. No analyst covers it. The competitive set is fuzzy. Market sizing is top-down and unfalsifiable. And “we are differentiated” cannot be judged by anyone who has never carried a number in enterprise software.

This is not about catching anyone out. Most sellers believe their own story, and a good part of it is usually true. The work is separating the part that holds from the part that was never tested, then saying how the thing should be selling instead.

Four questions, and the evidence behind each answer

Huge market, and we've barely scratched it.

Is the potential real?

The market reachable with this product, this price point and this motion, not the one in the top-down slide. Where growth would actually have to come from, and whether anything in the company today is capable of getting it.

We have a repeatable sales process.

Does the commercial engine work?

Pipeline quality against pipeline size. Win rates by segment, sales cycle, discount discipline, what a renewal really costs to earn. And the question underneath all of them: does this sell without the founder in the room?

Customers love us. Here are three references.

What does the market actually say?

Primary interviews: current customers, churned customers, lost deals, ex-sales staff, channel partners. References are prepared. Losses are not, and they tell you considerably more.

The main risk is execution.

How should it be selling instead?

The pricing move, the segment or the motion that changes the trajectory, sized, sequenced and costed. Not a list of risks and a wish for better execution, but the version of this company that a good operator would be running twelve months from now.

Four engagements, and where each one sits

Two moments in a deal, and a different problem in each. The ladder rises with complexity, from a first read taken before you have a seat at the table to a year spent on the board.

All four in detail

How the answer gets built

Four layers, each one there because the layer beneath it can be wrong on its own. None of them decides anything alone.

  1. Reconstruction
  2. Primary evidence
  3. Observation
  4. Judgment

The method in full

The SaaS Commercial Red Flag Score

Twelve questions you can answer from the seller's information pack and one management call, before you spend anything on diligence. Score each one, add them up, and you have a defensible read on whether the commercial case is worth paying to test.

Run the twelve questions

Free, and the result is shown in full. No email required.

Insights

Teardowns of commercial cases that did not survive contact, and a few that did. Written for people who have to make the call, not for people who write about making it.

Nobody can state the ROI, so nobody can defend the price

A company that cannot express what its product is worth in the customer's own numbers will discount under pressure, lose renewals it should win, and never raise prices. This is one of the most tractable problems in the first hundred days after an acquisition.

Pricing built before the market changed

Most software companies at this size price per seat, on a model set years ago. Buyers increasingly want to pay for consumption or for outcomes, and investors increasingly prefer it. Moving is valuable and moving carelessly transfers real risk onto the vendor.

The ARR that is not ARR

Reported ARR routinely includes one-year cancellable contracts, implementation and services revenue, and one-off fees. Each is real revenue and none of it is recurring in the sense a multiple implies. Reconstructing the recurring base from source data is usually the single largest price mover in a software deal.

The cloud bill and the margin

Software margins are under pressure from infrastructure and inference costs, and the pressure is uneven across customers. A healthy blended margin routinely hides accounts that lose money. Recovering it is a multi-quarter program, not a cost-cutting exercise.

All insights