Pricing built before the market changed
Most software companies at this size price per seat, on a model set years ago. Buyers increasingly want to pay for consumption or for outcomes, and investors increasingly prefer it. Moving is valuable and moving carelessly transfers real risk onto the vendor.

Per-seat pricing was a good answer to a question that has changed. It assumed the number of people using the software was a reasonable proxy for the value they got from it. When software automates the work rather than assisting the person doing it, that proxy breaks, and the vendor is left charging for headcount in a product whose entire pitch is needing less of it.
The market has moved and the direction is not ambiguous. The 2026 Stripo research across more than a thousand B2B SaaS companies found per-seat still the most common model at roughly 58 percent, with usage-based options now offered by 42 percent of products, up from 27 percent in 2023. Chargebee’s 2025 State of Subscriptions Report put hybrid models, a base fee plus a metered component, at 43 percent of companies with adoption projected to reach 61 percent by the end of 2026. Gartner forecasts that 40 percent of enterprise software will include outcome-based elements by 2026, against roughly 15 percent two years earlier.
The investor view is sharper still. A 2026 survey of 230 B2B software and AI companies asked which pricing model investors preferred: 10 percent said flat-fee subscriptions and 5 percent said seat-based, against 26 percent for outcome-based, 35 percent for hybrid and 24 percent for usage-based.
For a buyer, that is a repricing opportunity sitting inside a company that has not taken it.
The part nobody puts in the deck
Outcome-based pricing moves risk from the customer to the vendor, and the vendor is now you.
Under a subscription, you are paid whether or not the customer succeeds. Under an outcome model, you are paid when a result occurs, which means your revenue now depends on the customer’s data quality, their process, their adoption, and their willingness to agree that the result happened. Disputes about attribution become disputes about invoices.
It also destabilizes the forecast. Recurring revenue is valuable to an acquirer partly because it is predictable, and consumption revenue is structurally less so. A company mid-transition can show a growth story and a forecasting problem at the same time.
And it interacts with cost. Aleph’s 2026 benchmark data shows median software gross margin holding at 80 percent, but usage-only pricing sitting at 62 percent, because in a consumption model compute cost scales with the revenue rather than against a fixed subscription.
What good looks like after close
Hybrid, almost always: a platform fee that protects the forecast, plus a metered layer that captures value where it varies. Migrate the base in cohorts rather than all at once, because the fastest way to convert a pricing improvement into churn is to reprice everyone in the same quarter. And model the margin at the new pricing before announcing it, not after.
This is a hundred-day project with a measurable outcome, and it is one of the few levers that improves revenue quality and revenue growth simultaneously.
More teardowns
Nobody can state the ROI, so nobody can defend the price
A company that cannot express what its product is worth in the customer's own numbers will discount under pressure, lose renewals it should win, and never raise prices. This is one of the most tractable problems in the first hundred days after an acquisition.
The ARR that is not ARR
Reported ARR routinely includes one-year cancellable contracts, implementation and services revenue, and one-off fees. Each is real revenue and none of it is recurring in the sense a multiple implies. Reconstructing the recurring base from source data is usually the single largest price mover in a software deal.
Last updated

